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INTRODUCTION 
Along with the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and international terrorism, the Director of 
National Intelligence has identified the threat posed by 
foreign intelligence as one of the top three national security 
concerns to the United States.1  There are four million people 
in the United States with access to classified government 
information, and they are increasingly targeted by foreign 
intelligence services interested in obtaining U.S. national 
security-related information.2  As noted by the former Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Associate Deputy Director of 
Operations for Counterintelligence before the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the intelligence 
services of at least forty-one countries are attempting to 
obtain classified U.S. government secrets.3  Indeed, Russian 
intelligence operations in the United States have recently 
returned to levels seen only during the height of the Cold 
War.4 
 
 1. STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD ON THE WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT 
OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT 
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 112th Cong. 1, at 3 (2011) (statement of James 
R. Clapper, Director, National Intelligence), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/20110210_testimony
_hpsci_clapper.pdf. 
 2. See How to Catch a Spy, TIME MAG., June 21 2005, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1074835,00.html. 
 3. SHARAD S. CHAUHAN, INSIDE C.I.A.: LESSONS IN INTELLIGENCE 357 
(2004).  
 4. Michelle Van Cleave, Strategic Counterintelligence: What Is It and What 
Should We Do About It?, 51 STUD. IN INTELLIGENCE 1, 3 (2007), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/csipublications/csi 
-studies/studies/vol51no2/Studies_v51no2_2007-5Jun.pdf. (stating that “foreign 
powers increasingly are running intelligence operations with unprecedented 
independence from their diplomatic establishments. . . . Russia, reversing a 
sharp decline that took place during the late Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, now has 
an intelligence presence in the United States equal to its Cold War level, a 
sizing decision presumably indicative of the return on investment.”). 
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For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
in 2010 arrested ten illegals—spies clandestinely inserted 
into the United States by foreign intelligence services—for 
conducting intelligence operations on behalf of Russia’s 
primary external intelligence service—the SVR.5  The illegals 
spent years, and in some cases decades, developing fake 
identities in the United States while attempting to collect 
intelligence for Russia and awaiting orders on future targets.6  
While the arrests are certainly an accomplishment for U.S. 
counterintelligence officials, this one network of illegals pales 
in comparison to the pervasiveness of possible foreign 
intelligence operations ongoing in the United States.  Sergei 
Tretyakov, the Russian intelligence officer responsible for 
SVR operations in New York City from 1995 to 2005, revealed 
that at one point he was in charge of sixty SVR officers in 
addition to “160 contacts made up of illegals, outright spies, 
and other people who knowingly or unknowingly could supply 
information useful to Russia.”7  These figures are troubling—
they represent the activities of just one spy ring, from just 
one foreign intelligence service, in just one U.S. city. 
Another concern within the counterintelligence 
community is the growing threat of economic and industrial 
espionage.8  Foreign intelligence services are increasingly 
seeking out information about sensitive technologies beyond 
traditional military and government secrets.9  For example, 
the Chinese government has developed a “pervasive 
 
 5. Walter Pincus, Fine Print: Despite Arrests, Russian ‘Illegals’ Won’t Go 
Away, WASH. POST, July 13, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/12/AR2010071205341.html. 
 6. Ellen Barry, ‘Illegals’ Spy Ring Famed in Lore of Russian Spying, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/world/ 
europe/30sleepers.html. 
 7. Pincus, supra note 5. 
 8. OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC. (ONCIX), ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL 
ESPIONAGE, FY 2008, at iii (2009), available at http://www.ncix.gov/publications 
/reports/fecie_all/fecie_2008/2008_FECIE_Blue.pdf.  Economic espionage is the 
“knowing misappropriation of trade secrets with the knowledge or intent that 
the offense will benefit a foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign 
agent.  Misappropriation includes, but is not limited to, stealing, copying, 
altering, destroying, transmitting, sending, receiving, buying, possessing, or 
conspiring to obtain trade secrets without authorization.”  Id. at v.  Examples of 
trade secrets include “financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or 
engineering information.”  Id. 
 9. See id. at iii. 
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intelligence and security apparatus” that exploits the large 
number of Chinese nationals traveling to the United States 
seeking education and employment.10  The Deputy Director of 
the FBI for Counterintelligence recently noted that there are 
approximately 3200 Chinese front companies in the United 
States operating for the sole purpose of gaining proprietary 
information and sensitive technologies.11  For example, the 
Department of Justice recently filed economic espionage 
charges against five individuals and five companies controlled 
by the People’s Republic of China for the theft of titanium 
dioxide production technologies from E.I. du Pont de Nemours 
and Company (commonly referred to as DuPont).12  And 
China is not alone in this effort.  The FBI stated that at least 
one hundred countries are attempting to purchase sensitive 
U.S. technologies, and fifty-seven of those countries are 
actively “engaging in covert operations against U.S. 
corporations.”13  Apart from China, the most aggressive 
offenders noted by the FBI include France, Israel, Russia, 
Iran, Cuba, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Japan, 
Canada, India, and several Scandinavian countries.14 
This paper proposes a novel weapon to combat the rising 
tide of foreign intelligence threats: expansion of the U.S. Anti-
Money Laundering (AML) regime to uncover financial 
transactions related to foreign intelligence.  Under current 
U.S. AML laws, all financial institutions must monitor the 
identities and financial transactions of their clients.15  
Throughout this process, the institutions are required to 
create a “profile” for all clients, and monitor their 
transactions to ensure that the transactions are considered 
 
 10. Larry M. Wortzel, Risks and Opportunities of a Rising China, THE 
HERITAGE FOUND., 6 (Jun. 22, 2006), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/ 
thf_media/2006/pdf/hl948.pdf. 
 11. Id. 
 12. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. AND CHINESE 
DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND THEFT OF TRADE 
SECRETS IN CONNECTION WITH CONSPIRACY TO SELL TRADE SECRETS TO 
CHINESE COMPANIES (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/2012/February/12-nsd-180.html. 
 13. HEDIEH NASHERI, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND INDUSTRIAL SPYING 8 
(2005). 
 14. See id. 
 15. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l) (2011); see also 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (2010); 31 C.F.R. 
§ 103.18(a)(2).   
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normal for that individual’s profile.16  The financial 
institution must report any unusual activity, such as an 
unexplained cash deposit, to the federal government.17  This 
paper argues that financial institutions could alter their AML 
programs to detect transactions that may suggest foreign 
intelligence activity.  A U.S. government employee makes an 
unusual cash deposit in addition to his current wages.  A 
foreign national opens a bank account with suspicious 
documentation and then receives regular wire transfers from 
his home country, or from his home country traced through 
an overseas third party.  A corporation within the U.S. 
defense industry engages in a transaction with a foreign shell 
corporation for no apparent business purpose.  Each of these 
isolated situations may never catch the attention of 
counterintelligence officials working in the United States.  
Under this proposal, however, such transactions could trigger 
AML suspicion and be reported to the federal government by 
financial institutions. 
Although financial institutions may already identify 
some of these transactions as traditional money laundering or 
terrorism finance efforts and report them to the federal 
government under the current AML regime, there are three 
reasons why change is needed.  First, the agency that receives 
reports of suspicious activity—the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—is woefully underfunded 
for the number of reports it already receives.18  As such, it has 
prioritized analysis of those reports that deal primarily with 
terrorism finance.19  Suspicious transactions suggesting 
foreign intelligence activity that would otherwise go 
unnoticed could be forwarded immediately to 
counterintelligence elements of U.S. intelligence agencies for 
further investigation. 
Second, FinCEN has focused its resources on developing 
typologies specific to general money laundering activity and 
 
 16. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(a); 31 C.F.R. § 103.121. 
 17. 31 C.F.R. § 103.18. 
 18. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF), SUMMARY OF THE THIRD MUTUAL 
EVALUATION REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE 
FINANCING OF TERRORISM: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/standards-
codes/Documents/mer-executive-summary.pdf. 
 19. Id. 
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terrorism finance.20  A typology describes “typical tactics used 
by launderers or patterns that indicate a higher risk of 
laundering,”21 and are provided to financial institutions so 
that the institution actually understands what a suspicious 
transaction would look like.22  At the present time, no 
concerted effort has been made to develop typologies that 
would suggest foreign intelligence activity.23  Thus, financial 
institutions are unable to identify many transactions that 
could suggest such activity. 
Third, the pervasive threat that foreign intelligence 
operations pose to the United States warrants heightened 
scrutiny of those with access to classified information and 
sensitive technologies.  Financial institutions should be 
required to expand their due diligence efforts of clients 
working within the federal government and within industries 
with access to sensitive U.S. technologies. 
Part I of this Article discusses foreign intelligence 
activities and the threats they pose to U.S. security interests.  
Part II discusses the current anti-money laundering regime 
and the methods used to uncover illegal activity.  Part III 
advocates changes to the AML system necessary to identify 
foreign intelligence activity.  It also discusses potential issues 
with compliance by financial institutions, and the need for 
additional counterintelligence community discussions on 
potential indicators and typologies for identifying 
transactions that suggest foreign intelligence activity. 
 
 
 20. See id. 
 21. Richard K. Gordon, Trysts of Terrorists?  Financial Institutions and the 
Search for Bad Guys, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 726 (2008). 
 22. See PAUL ALLAN SCHOTT, THE WORLD BANK, REFERENCE GUIDE TO 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM I-10 
(2d ed. 2006) (“The various techniques used to launder money or finance 
terrorism are generally referred to as methods or typologies.”).  
 23.  For example, FATF’s most recent Global Money Laundering & Terrorist 
Financing Threat Assessment provides an “overview of the systemic money 
laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) threats and ultimate harms that 
they can cause.”  FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF), GLOBAL MONEY 
LAUNDERING & TERRORIST FINANCING THREAT ASSESSMENT 3 (2010), 
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Global%20Threat%20asses
sment.pdf.  An extensive list of money laundering typologies and recommended 
financial countermeasures is provided in Annex D.  The document does not offer 
any guidance on money laundering activities specific to the counterintelligence 
field.  See  id. at  69–75. 
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I. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
A. A General Overview of Intelligence Activities 
At the most basic level, intelligence activities offer “a 
particular kind of information that helps to inform, instruct, 
and educate the policy world.”24  Intelligence missions 
generally fall into one of three categories: (1) collection and 
analysis, (2) counterintelligence, or (3) covert action.25  The 
first form of intelligence—collection and analysis—focuses on 
gathering information from technical sources (TECHINT),26 
signals intelligence (SIGINT),27 human sources (HUMINT), 
and open-source literature (OSINT).28  Once this information 
is collected, it is amassed and processed by intelligence 
officers to offer insight to relevant geopolitical issues.29  This 
new information is then disseminated to policymakers.30 
The second type of intelligence mission—
counterintelligence—comprises those activities intended to 
defeat foreign intelligence officers collecting information.31  
For example, Executive Order 12333 defines 
counterintelligence, in part, as “information gathered and 
activities conducted to protect against espionage, other 
intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted 
for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or 
international terrorist activities.”32  This can include both the 
discovery of moles within the country’s own intelligence 
 
 24. MICHAEL A. TURNER, WHY SECRET INTELLIGENCE FAILS 3 (2005).  
Turner defines intelligence as “policy-relevant information, collected through 
open and clandestine means and subjected to analysis, for the purposes of 
educating, enlightening, or helping American decision makers in formulating 
and implementing national security and foreign policy.”  Id. at 4.  
 25. Loch K. Johnson, An Introduction to the Intelligence Studies Literature, 
in STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE 1: UNDERSTANDING THE HIDDEN SIDE OF 
GOVERNMENT 1, 4 (Loch K. Johnson ed., 2007). 
 26. Id.  TECHINT could include images from satellites and reconnaissance 
planes.  Id. 
 27. Id.  SIGINT is the interception of signals such as telephone 
conversations or electronic communications.  See id. 
 28. Id.  OSINT could include information from newspapers or public 
speeches.  Id. 
 29. Id. at 5. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. at 6. 
 32. Exec. Order No. 12333 § 3.4(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981). 
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services33 and foreign intelligence assets working within the 
country.34  However, counterintelligence efforts also include 
providing personnel security, protecting information that 
counterintelligence officials believe foreign governments 
would be interested in obtaining, and misleading and 
misdirecting foreign spies away from the country’s real 
secrets.35 
Covert action, the third type of intelligence mission, is 
activity intended to “secretly influence and manipulate events 
abroad.”36  These activities can include “the use of 
propaganda, political activities, economic disruption, and 
paramilitary operations.”37  In the United States, covert 
activities have included the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961 and 
the Iran-contra affair in 1986.38  While the U.S. Intelligence 
Community is actively engaged in each of these efforts, this 
Article focuses on the second: defeating foreign intelligence 
activities adverse to U.S. interests. 
B. Foreign Intelligence Threats to the United States 
The “treasure trove” of U.S. information targeted by 
foreign intelligence threats lies within the United States.39  
This is because foreign intelligence officers are primarily 
concerned with three things: (1) the organizations and 
individuals responsible for setting American policy; (2) the 
research and development efforts of U.S. weapons, nuclear, 
and technological enterprise industries; and (3) the facilities 
and employees engaged in classified national security 
efforts.40  U.S. activity in these three areas is primarily 
conducted domestically; thus, the majority of foreign 
intelligence threats are engaged in activity within U.S. 
 
 33. Some of the best sources of intelligence are citizens of the target 
country.  KATHERINE L. HERBIG & MARTIN F. WISKOFF, DEF. PERSONNEL SEC. 
RESEARCH CTR., ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BY AMERICAN 
CITIZENS 1947–2001, at 1 (2002), available at http://www.dhra.mil/ 
perserec/reports/tr02-05.pdf. 
 34. See TURNER, supra note 24, at 126. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Johnson, supra note 25, at 7. 
 37. Id. at 4. 
 38. Id. at 7. 
 39. Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 3. 
 40.  See id. 
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borders.41 
In the intelligence community, there are two types of 
foreign intelligence case officers that travel to the United 
States: those who operate under diplomatic or official “cover,” 
and those who do not.42  Intelligence officers working under 
official cover enter the United States as a member of the 
country’s diplomatic corps or as a military liaison.43  This 
employment is a pretense; they are provided a cover story and 
normal identification cards, but actively engage in 
intelligence collection activities in that target country.44  
Historically, U.S. counterintelligence efforts have focused on 
“embassies and other diplomatic establishments . . . because 
of the operational security they afford.”45  As such, the United 
States can usually identify these spies without issue; routine 
surveillance can easily be conducted on foreigners working in 
embassies within the United States.46 
However, some foreign intelligence case officers work 
under “nonofficial cover,” meaning they have no official 
connections with their home country’s government.47  These 
officers typically work in commercial or private enterprises as 
a pretense, engaging in intelligence collection activities on the 
side for their home country.48  These nonofficial cover agents 
are sometimes referred to as “illegals.”49  Foreign 
governments secretly insert these illegals into the United 
States making it hard to identify them because they 
“masquerade as ordinary Americans.”50 
In recent years, globalization has promoted the use of the 
illegals technique.  A former U.S. National 
Counterintelligence Executive notes that “we have seen a 
growing number of intelligence operations within our borders, 
facilitated by an extensive foreign presence that provides 
 
 41. Id. at 4 n.d (“Three-quarters of the U.S. [counterintelligence] budget 
since World War II has been devoted to activities within the United States  
. . . .”). 
 42. See TURNER, supra note 24, at 90–91. 
 43. Id. at 90. 
 44. See id. at 91.  
 45. Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 3. 
 46. See TURNER, supra note 24, at 132. 
 47. See id. at 91. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Id. at 132.  
 50. Id. 
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cover for intelligence services and their agents.”51  She 
continued: 
Foreign powers increasingly are running intelligence 
operations with unprecedented independence from their 
diplomatic establishments.  The number of formal and 
informal ports of entry to the country, the ease with which 
people can travel internally, and the relatively benign 
operational environment of the United States are tailor 
made for embedded clandestine collection activities.  
Thousands of foreign owned commercial establishments in 
the United States, the routine interactions of trade and 
transnational business and finance, and the exchange of 
hundreds of thousands of students and academicians, all 
potentially extend the reach of foreign intelligence into the 
core structures of our nation’s security.52 
In this globalized world, there is now even a “market” for 
U.S. national security-related information.53  Indeed, 
counterintelligence officials believe that the intelligence 
services of at least forty-one countries are attempting to 
obtain classified U.S. government secrets.54 
Of great concern is the fact that illegals have increasingly 
targeted U.S. economic and commercial secrets.55  Under 
attack are corporations, research centers, and universities.56  
In FY 2007, the FBI opened fifty-five new cases of economic 
espionage and continued investigations of another eighty-
eight cases.57  In FY 2008, Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement arrested 158 individuals on charges related to 
the exportation of sensitive U.S. technologies.58  In that same 
time period, the Department of Commerce investigated an 
 
 51. Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 3. 
 52. Id. at 3. 
 53. Id. at 2; see also RICHARD A. BEST, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41848,  
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION: NEED-TO-KNOW VS. NEED-TO-SHARE 12 (2011) 
(“Foreign countries (including friendly ones or even allies) may not turn down 
opportunities to gain insight into U.S. policymaking or military capabilities.  
Various anti-American organizations worldwide eagerly seek information that 
can damage or embarrass the U.S. Government. Major media outlets, not all of 
which are in foreign countries, consider themselves free to publish classified 
information regardless of possible damage to U.S. persons, interests, or foreign 
supporters. There is, in short, an active market for classified information . . . .”).    
 54. CHAUHAN, supra note 3, at 357. 
 55. TURNER, supra note 24, at 132. 
 56. Id. 
 57. ONCIX, supra note 8, at 1. 
 58. Id. 
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additional 792 export violations.59  Individuals arrested for 
economic and industrial espionage against the United States 
have come from countries including China, Cuba, India, and 
Iran.60  However, evidence suggests that fifty-seven nations 
are actively engaging in covert activity against U.S. 
corporations, and forty-three more are attempting to 
purchase sensitive U.S. technologies.61  While the United 
States has focused the majority of its counterintelligence 
assets on threats to government secrets, recent trends have 
required it to shift some of these resources to protecting 
commercial secrets.62 
Both types of foreign intelligence officers—cover and 
nonofficial cover agents—also actively seek to recruit 
Americans whose employment offers them access to secret 
information.63  In fact, most illegals enter the country to 
gather information on those who could potentially be turned 
as spies, foregoing opportunities to collect information 
themselves.64  The problem is pervasive; the U.S. government 
has caught and convicted over one thousand American 
citizens for acts of espionage since World War II.65 
The first step in thwarting foreign intelligence activities 
is to identify who the foreign intelligence assets are.66  While 
U.S. counterintelligence may have a good grasp on the 
identities of official cover agents working in the United 
States, more hidden are the illegals and the Americans 
committing espionage.67  Uncovering these hidden spies and 
their cover organizations is a primary goal for U.S. 
counterintelligence officials, and is the focus of this Article. 
C. United States Agencies Engaged in Counterintelligence 
Activities 
The majority of counterintelligence activity conducted by 
the United States is shared between the FBI, CIA, and 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. app. B, at 9–12. 
 61. See NASHERI, supra note 13, at 8. 
 62. See TURNER, supra note 24, at 127. 
 63. See Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 3. 
 64. See Pincus, supra note 5. 
 65. TURNER, supra note 24, at 134. 
 66. See id. at 132. 
 67. Id.  
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Department of Defense.68  The CIA is generally responsible 
for those counterintelligence activities outside U.S. borders.69  
Within the United States, the CIA counterintelligence team is 
tasked only with the security of its own employees unless 
working in conjunction with the FBI.70  Some departments 
and agencies have specialized counterintelligence units, with 
mission-specific objectives.  For example, the Department of 
Defense has counterintelligence units throughout its 
branches and within its Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).71  
But the lion’s share of domestic counterintelligence activity 
falls to the FBI.72  In fact, three-fourths of all money spent on 
U.S. counterintelligence efforts since World War II has been 
on the FBI’s domestic counterintelligence program.73 
During the 1990s, President Clinton formed both the 
National Counterintelligence Center (NCIC) and the National 
Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) to provide a cohesive 
approach to U.S. counterintelligence efforts.74  However, 
commentators note that both organizations have been 
ineffective in this regard, leaving much of the 
counterintelligence decision-making with individual 
agencies.75 
II. AML REGULATIONS 
To understand how the AML regime can be applied to 
counterintelligence activity, it is important first to 
understand the crime of money laundering, the international 
standards that led to AML efforts within the United States, 
and the specific U.S. laws that implement these international 
standards. 
 
 68. See id. at 36. 
 69. Exec. Order No. 12333 §§ 1.8(a)–(d), 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981); 
see also TURNER, supra note 24, at 99. 
 70. Exec. Order No. 12333 §§ 1.8(a), (h), 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981); 
see also TURNER, supra note 24, at 36. 
 71. See TURNER, supra note 24, at 28–30; Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 2. 
 72. See 50 U.S.C. § 402a(e) (2005) (“Coordination of counterintelligence 
matters with Federal Bureau of Investigation.”); see also TURNER, supra note 
24, at 99. 
 73. Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 4 n.d. 
 74. TURNER, supra note 24, at 127. 
 75. See id. at 127–28; Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
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A. The Crime of Money Laundering 
Money laundering is “the process by which proceeds from 
a criminal activity are disguised to conceal their illicit 
origins.”76  A predicate offense is criminal activity that 
generates proceeds, which when laundered, leads to the crime 
of money laundering.77  While the international community’s 
first attempts to criminalize the act of money laundering 
focused on crimes related to drug trafficking,78 later treaties 
require countries to criminalize money laundering to “the 
widest range of predicate offenses.”79 
As a hypothetical, Donny Dealer sells one thousand 
dollars’ worth of drugs to his neighbor.  Donny takes that 
cash, enters a casino, and trades the cash for chips.  He 
gambles for a few minutes and then redeems the chips at the 
casino, but asks the casino to deposit the money into his bank 
account.  Donny now has about one thousand dollars in his 
bank account and, if questioned about the origins of this 
money, can claim that he won all of it at the casino.  He then 
uses that money to purchase a used moped, perhaps to 
expand his customer base.  The predicate offense in this 
example would be the sale of illegal narcotics.  But, Donny 
would also be culpable for the crime of money laundering, 
because he took the proceeds of his crime and attempted to 
disguise their illicit origins. 
Money laundering activities generally include three 
stages: placement, layering and integration.80  Following the 
generation of proceeds of crime, money laundering 
 
 76. SCHOTT, supra note 22, at I-1 (emphasis omitted).  
 77. Id. at I-3. 
 78. See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances, 1998, Dec. 19, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493, available at  
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf. 
 79. See SCHOTT, supra note 22, at I-3 (quoting United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention), art. 6(2)(a) 
(2000), available at http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/ 
final_documents_2/convention_eng.pdf).  For example, the United States has 
classified all Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) predicate 
offenses, such as murder, kidnapping, and extortion, as well as numerous other 
federal crimes, as money laundering predicate offenses.  CHARLES DOYLE, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22401, MONEY LAUNDERING: AN ABRIDGED 
OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. 1956 AND RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 2 (2012).  
For a comprehensive list of predicate offenses in the United States, see 18 
U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (2012). 
 80. SCHOTT, supra note 22, at I-7. 
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commences with the placement of the proceeds into the 
financial system.81  The primary purpose of this step is to 
introduce “dirty” money into the system “without attracting 
the attention of financial institutions or law enforcement.”82  
This can be a deposit at a bank, a purchase of an asset like an 
automobile, the exchange of currency, or the conversion into 
financial instruments such as money orders or checks.83  In 
our example, Donny Dealer engaged in placement of his 
illegal proceeds when he exchanged the cash for casino chips. 
Following placement, the money launderer will engage in 
layering.84  Layering can include a range of activities such as 
moving or selling the bank deposits, financial instruments, or 
purchased assets to different financial institutions.85  The 
money launderer may use overseas shell corporations in this 
step, may hide the transfer as a payment for goods or 
services, or may merely transfer the placed money among 
several banks.86  The purpose of this step is to “create 
confusion and complicate the paper trail.”87  Donny Dealer 
engaged in placement activities when he cashed in his casino 
chips and transferred his “winnings” to his bank account. 
Finally, the money launderer must engage in 
integration.88  This involves integrating the funds back into 
the legitimate economy.89  It is often accomplished by 
purchasing an asset such as real estate, securities, or luxury 
goods.90  The purpose of doing so would be to provide the 
criminal with a “plausible explanation for the source of the 
funds.”91  Donny Dealer integrated his proceeds of crime back 
into the legitimate economy by purchasing the moped.  He 
now has legitimate title to the vehicle and can use it or sell it 
without raising suspicion. 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL (FFIEC), BANK SECRECY 
ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 12 (2010), available at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/BSA_AML_Man_2010.pdf. 
 83. See SCHOTT, supra note 22, at I-7. 
 84. Id. at I-8. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at I-8–I-9.  
 87. FFIEC, supra note 82, at 12. 
 88. SCHOTT, supra note 22, at I-9. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. FFIEC, supra note 82, at 12. 
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B. International Techniques to Combat Money Laundering 
Activities 
Countries that implement effective techniques to combat 
money laundering see significant benefits to their 
economies.92  Anti-money laundering efforts can assist in 
fighting crime and corruption,93 enhance the stability of 
financial institutions,94 and encourage economic 
development.95  In order to develop an international response 
to money laundering, the G-7 countries formed the Financial 
Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) in 1989.96  
FATF adopted “Forty Recommendations,” which are now 
regarded as the relevant international standard for AML.97  
Any country desiring to comply with international AML 
standards must implement laws in its own country that fulfill 
these Forty Recommendations.98  While the Forty 
Recommendations cover a wide range of legal requirements, 
the most pertinent to counterintelligence activities are those 
pertaining to prevention and discovery of money laundering 
activity. 
 
 
 92. See SCHOTT, supra note 22, at II-7. 
 93. See id. (“When money laundering itself is made a crime, it provides 
another avenue to prosecute criminals, both those who commit the underlying 
criminal acts and those who assist them through laundering illegally obtained 
funds.  Similarly, an [AML] framework that includes bribery as a predicate 
offense and is enforced effectively provides fewer opportunities for criminals to 
bribe or otherwise corrupt public officials.”). 
 94. Id. at II-8 (“Public confidence in financial institutions, and hence their 
stability, is enhanced by sound banking practices that reduce financial risks to 
their operations.”).  
 95. See id. at II-8–II-9 (“Money laundering has a direct negative effect on 
economic growth by diverting resources to less productive activities. . . . Rather 
than being placed in productive channels for further investment, laundered 
funds are often placed into ‘sterile’ investments to preserve their value or make 
them more easily transferable. . . . Even worse, criminal organizations may 
transform productive enterprises into sterile investments by operating them for 
the primary purpose of laundering illegal proceeds, rather than as profit-
generating enterprises.”). 
 96. Id. at III-7.  G-7 countries include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  Id. at III-7 n.30.  FATF 
later also assumed responsibilities for combating the financing of terrorism.  Id. 
at III-8. 
 97. Id. at III-9. 
 98. See id.  
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1. Customer Identification and Due Diligence 
The first AML prevention technique required by FATF 
involves customer identification and due diligence.  More 
commonly known as Know-Your-Customer (KYC) rules,99 this 
group of recommendations requires countries to implement 
laws that place duties on banking and financial institutions 
to keep detailed records on their customers.100  To this end, 
financial institutions must at all times verify the true 
identities of their clients.101  Where the client is a legal entity, 
such as a corporation, the financial institution must take 
reasonable steps to determine the true parent company and 
owner of the client.102  Where the institution has reason to 
believe that the client is acting on behalf of a third party, the 
financial institution should take similar due diligence 
measures to verify the identity of this third-party 
beneficiary.103 
Institutions must also collect information on the nature 
of the business relationship it will have with the client.104  
Using this information, the institution must create a profile 
for each client so that the institution can understand what 
financial transactions would be normal for that client.105  The 
institution is required to conduct ongoing due diligence in 
light of this profile, scrutinizing the client’s transactions to 
ensure that they are “consistent with the institution’s 
knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, 
including, where necessary, the source of funds.”106 
Returning to the previous example, when Donny Dealer 
opened his bank account, he had to provide documentation to 
 
 99. Id. at VI-3 & n.6 (citing BASEL COMM., CORE PRINCIPLE FOR EFFECTIVE 
BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLE 15 (1997) as the origin of the term “know-
your-customer”). 
 100. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF), 40 RECOMMENDATIONS 4–7 (2010), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF%20Standards 
%20-%2040%20Recommendations%20rc.pdf; SCHOTT, supra note 22, at VI-2. 
 101. FATF, supra note 100, at 4–5. 
 102. Id. at 5; SCHOTT, supra note 22, at VI-4 (“When corporations or legal 
entities are involved, appropriate due diligence measures should be employed to 
determine the identity of the actual parent or controlling entity.”). 
 103. FATF, supra note 100, at 5; SCHOTT, supra note 22, at VI-4 (“If there is 
any reason to suspect that the customer is acting on behalf of another person or 
entity, appropriate due diligence measures should be instituted.”). 
 104. FATF, supra note 100, at 5.  
 105. See id.  
 106. Id.  
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prove his identity, and when asked about his profession, 
Donny informed the bank that he was a law professor.  As a 
law professor, the bank would expect to see a salary paid into 
his account on a regular basis, as these transactions would be 
typical for a law professor.  If Donny were to deposit one 
million dollars cash in small bills over the course of a year, 
this would raise red flags at Donny’s bank, and the bank 
would need to investigate further and perhaps even report 
the transactions to the government.  In contrast, Donny’s 
neighbor, Gus, owns a gas station.  If Gus were to deposit one 
million dollars cash in small bills into his bank account over 
the course of one year, the bank may consider this normal in 
light of Gus’s business, and forego further scrutiny. 
Certain types of risky clients automatically warrant 
heightened scrutiny under FATF’s recommendations because 
FATF considers them more likely to engage in money 
laundering activities.107  For example, clients that are 
classified as Politically Exposed Persons (PEP) require 
heightened due diligence.108  FATF defines PEPs, in part, as 
“individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent 
public functions in a foreign country.”109  Examples of PEPs 
include Heads of State, senior government officials or 
politicians, members of a country’s judiciary, and high-
ranking military officials.110  Risky clients may also include 
foreigners, legal persons such as trusts that are merely 
personal asset holding vehicles, and companies that have 
nominee shareholders or shares in bearer form.111 
Certain transactions also warrant heightened due 
diligence.112  Recommendation eleven requires financial 
institutions to afford increased scrutiny to “all complex, 
unusual large transactions, and all unusual patterns of 
transactions, which have no apparent economic or visible 
 
 107. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF), METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE FATF 9 SPECIAL 
RECOMMENDATIONS 17 (2009), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/ 
fatf/documents/reports/methodology.pdf (“Financial institutions should be 
required to perform enhanced due diligence for higher risk categories of 
customer, business relationship or transaction.”). 
 108. See FATF, supra note 100, at 5–6. 
 109. Id. at 17.  
 110. Id. 
 111. FATF, supra note 107, at 17. 
 112. FATF, supra note 100, at 7. 
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lawful purpose.”113  The Recommendation requires the 
institution to ascertain, “as far as possible,” the 
circumstances and purpose of the transaction.114  Institutions 
should document the findings in writing and make them 
available to law enforcement authorities.115 
2. Suspicious Transaction Reporting 
Upon discovery of any transaction that appears to involve 
money laundering, a financial institution must report that 
information to its country’s Financial Intelligence Unit 
(FIU).116  When determining which transactions involve 
money laundering, financial institutions must rely upon the 
risk profiles created for each account and create systems that 
screen transactions for abnormal activity.117  Financial 
institutions need not have evidence that the client is engaged 
in money laundering before it reports the transaction to its 
FIU.118  Instead, institutions must merely have “ ‘suspicion’ 
that funds may be related to a criminal offense.”119 
In Donny Dealer’s case, it probably would not be 
abnormal for a law professor to win one thousand dollars at a 
casino; therefore, Donny’s bank probably would not report the 
transfer of those funds from the casino.  The casino, however, 
may find it suspicious if Donny trades cash for chips, and 
then trades in the chips for a bank deposit shortly after.  This 
may rise to the level of abnormality that would require the 
casino to report the transaction to its country’s FIU. 
3. Cash Transaction Reporting 
While not a requirement for a country to remain in 
compliance with international AML standards, FATF 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 8.  
 117. SCHOTT, supra note 22, at VI-19 (noting that any of the following may 
require further investigation: “[a]ssets withdrawn immediately after they are 
credited to an account,” “[a] dormant account suddenly becomes active without 
any plausible reason,” “[t]he high asset value of a client is not compatible with 
either the information concerning the client or the relevant business,” “[a] client 
provides false or doctored information or refuses to communicate requiring 
information to the bank,” and “[t]he arrangement of a transaction either 
insinuates an unlawful purpose, is economically illogical or unidentifiable.”). 
 118. Id. at VI-21. 
 119. Id. 
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recommends that countries implement laws requiring cash 
transaction reporting.120  Specifically, this would require 
financial institutions to report any transaction involving cash 
or its functional equivalent in an amount greater than the 
threshold level set by that country.121 
Of course, these threshold levels are known by criminals 
as well.  Therefore, FATF recommends that financial 
institutions aggregate all cash transactions conducted over 
the course of a certain time period, such as one day, to ensure 
that the client cannot avoid reporting requirements by 
engaging in many small transactions instead of one big 
transaction.122  Furthermore, financial institutions may find 
suspicious those cash transactions that are just below the 
reporting threshold, and the financial institution may report 
the transaction to its FIU regardless.123 
C. United States-Specific Regulations 
The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA) and the Money 
Laundering Control Act of 1986, both as amended by the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2002, implement the United States’ AML 
measures as required by the FATF recommendations.124  
Under this regime, all financial institutions are required to 
implement AML systems which must include “the 
development of internal policies, procedures and controls,” 
“the designation of a compliance officer,” “an ongoing 
employee training program,” and “an independent audit 
function to test programs.”125  The financial institution must 
implement a Customer Identification Program (CIP) that 
includes risk-based procedures that “enable the bank to form 
a reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of each 
customer.”126  Furthermore, heightened due diligence must be 
 
 120. See FATF, supra note 100, at 7–8. 
 121. SCHOTT, supra note 22, at VI-24. 
 122. Id. at VI-25. 
 123. Id. 
 124. U.S. S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND FOREIGN CORRUPTION: ENFORCEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS 
OF THE PATRIOT ACT 9, (2004), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public 
/_files/ACF5F8.pdf; FATF, supra note 18, at 3. 
 125. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1) (2011); FATF, supra note 18, at 5. 
 126. 31 C.F.R. § 103.121(b)(2) (2010).  See id. for a comprehensive list of all 
procedures financial institutions must implement to comply with U.S. CIP 
requirements.   
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observed for foreign financial institutions and wealthy foreign 
individuals.127 
Where a financial institution in the United States 
uncovers a suspicious transaction, that financial institution 
must report it to the U.S. FIU: FinCEN.128  The United States 
created FinCEN in 1990, under the umbrella of the U.S. 
Treasury Department.129  FinCEN does not investigate 
financial crimes, but serves as a “central source for financial 
intelligence information and analysis.”130  It has primary 
responsibility over all AML reports filed in the United 
States.131  Unfortunately, the sheer number of Suspicious 
Activity Reports (SARs) filed by financial institutions 
prevents effective analysis and review of each one.132  In 2004, 
FinCEN received over fourteen million reports, including 
600,000 SARs.133  Accordingly, FinCEN has prioritized those 
reports most valuable to law enforcement, such as those 
directly related to terrorism finance.134 
In particular, a bank must report a transaction that is 
more than five thousand dollars and where the bank “knows, 
suspects, or has reason to suspect that:” (1) the transaction 
involves the proceeds of crime; (2) the transaction is “designed 
to evade” AML rules and reporting requirements; or (3) the 
transaction “has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is 
not the sort in which the particular customer would normally 
be expected to engage, and the bank knows of no reasonable 
explanation for the transaction after examining the available 
facts, including the background and possible purpose of the 
transaction.”135  The bank must file a government-issued SAR 
form within thirty calendar days of discovering the suspicious 
nature of the transaction.136  For obvious reasons, the 
employees of the notifying institution may not disclose that 
 
 127. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i). 
 128. See id. at (g). 
 129. FATF, supra note 18, at 3. 
 130. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-141, ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING: IMPROVED COMMUNICATION COULD ENHANCE THE SUPPORT 
FINCEN PROVIDES TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10141.pdf. 
 131. See FATF, supra note 18, at 3. 
 132. See id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. 31 C.F.R. § 103.18(a)(2) (2010). 
 136. Id. at (b)(3).  
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such a report was made to anyone involved in the 
transaction.137 
The BSA also implemented rules for cash transaction 
reporting in the United States.  Financial institutions must 
keep a record and report any transaction using cash or bearer 
instruments in excess of $10,000.138  These reports are 
compiled into a computerized database and shared with all 
law enforcement agencies involved in AML activities,139 such 
as the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, and the U.S. Secret Service.140 
D. Suspicious Activity Reports in the United States 
The most recent version of the U.S. SAR form can be 
found on FinCEN’s website.141  Part I of the form asks for 
information identifying the financial institution, such as its 
name, address, and Federal Tax Identification Number.142  
Part II of the form requires extensive identifying information 
about the suspect, including his or her name, address, social 
security or tax identification number, contact information, 
occupation, date of birth, and relationship to the 
institution.143 
Part III asks in-depth questions about the nature of the 
suspicious activity being reported.144  Required information 
includes the total dollar amount involved, the dates that the 
transaction took place, and those law enforcement agencies 
that might have already been notified.145  Part III also 
includes a question asking the financial institution to 
characterize the nature of the suspicion using a series of 
checkboxes.146  The checkboxes are labeled “a” through “u,” 
and include such characterizations as “Bank Secrecy 
 
 137. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2) (2011). 
 138. SCHOTT, supra note 22, at VI-24. 
 139. FATF, supra note 18, at 4. 
 140. See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (FINCEN), 14 THE SAR 
ACTIVITY REV. 1, n.1 (2008). 
 141. See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (FINCEN), SUSPICIOUS 
ACTIVITY REPORT (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.fincen.gov/forms/ 
files/f9022-47_sar-di.pdf. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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Act/Structuring/Money Laundering,” “Bribery/Gratuity,” 
“Computer Intrusion,” “Credit Card Fraud,” 
“Defalcation/Embezzlement,” and “Identity Theft,” among 
others.147  Thus, the form is used to report more than just 
money laundering.148  Following the USA PATRIOT Act 
amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act, an additional checkbox 
“t” was added to the form for “Terrorist Financing.”149  Part IV 
of the form requires contact information for someone at the 
financial institution who may be able to provide further 
assistance to law enforcement, if necessary.150 
Part V may be the most critical portion of the form.151  It 
requires a lengthy free response, detailing the transaction 
and the reasons the financial institution may suspect illegal 
financial activity.152  The financial institution must also 
describe any supporting documentation it has and all parties 
involved in the transaction.153 
To assist financial institutions in reporting suspicious 
activity, FinCEN provides technical manuals and analytic 
reports to improve understanding of how money may be 
laundered in the future and how to identify it.154  In addition, 
FinCEN issues regulations and interpretive guidance for 
financial institutions.155  For example, FinCEN regularly 
publishes the SAR Activity Review, a periodical that provides 
“meaningful information about the preparation, use, and 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. The following is a comprehensive list of the checkboxes included on the 
form: Bank Secrecy Act/Structuring/Money Laundering, Bribery/Gratuity, 
Check Fraud, Check Kiting, Commercial Loan Fraud, Computer Intrusion, 
Consumer Loan Fraud, Counterfeit Check, Counterfeit Credit/Debit Card, 
Counterfeit Instrument (other), Credit Card Fraud, Debit Card Fraud, 
Defalcation/Embezzlement, False Statement, Misuse of Position or Self Dealing, 
Mortgage Loan Fraud, Mysterious Disappearance, Wire Transfer Fraud, Other 
(free response), Terrorist Financing, and Identity Theft.  Id. 
 149. See id.; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 130, at 
2 (discussing how the USA Patriot Act “expanded FinCEN’s role to include a 
focus on terrorism financing as well as money laundering”).  
 150. FINCEN, supra note 141. 
 151. Id. (“This section of the report is critical.  The care with which it is 
written may make the difference in whether or not the described conduct and its 
possible criminal nature are clearly understood.”). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. for a complete list of requirements for this free response 
question.  
 154. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 130, at 9. 
 155. FFIEC, supra note 82, at 9. 
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value of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) filed by financial 
institutions.”156  Financial institutions rely upon FinCEN’s 
findings and advice in identifying suspicious activity and 
when designing their detection algorithms used in their AML 
programs.157 
III. RECOMMENDATION: IMPLEMENT A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
DETECTION PROGRAM THAT BUILDS UPON THE CURRENT ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING REQUIREMENTS 
In response to growing concerns over terrorism finance, 
the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the scope of the AML 
requirements on financial institutions within the United 
States.158  It provided the Secretary of the Treasury with the 
authority to impose on financial institutions requirements to 
store records and file suspicious activity reports when doing 
so would be useful for counterintelligence activities related to 
counterterrorism efforts.159  This Article recommends that the 
scope of this requirement be expanded to encompass all U.S. 
counterintelligence activity, building off of the U.S. AML 
regime in a similar manner.  Supporting this proposition, 
commentators have argued the efficacy of managing foreign 
intelligence threats similarly to those threats posed by 
international terrorism, including financial analysis.160  
Detailed in this section are the workflows that should be 
implemented to coordinate this new counterintelligence 
program, suggestions for promoting compliance by financial 
institutions, and possible typologies for identifying foreign 
intelligence activity. 
 
 156. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (FINCEN), SAR ACTIVITY 
REVIEW—TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/ 
sar_tti.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2013). 
 157. See, e.g., Cheng-wei Zhang & Yu-bo Wang, Research on Application of 
Distributed Data Mining in Anti-Money Laundering Monitoring System, 2D 
INT’L CONF. ON ADVANCED COMPUTER CONTROL 133 (2010) (“Some developed 
countries have constituted a set of electronic system[s] to detect money-
laundering by the use of Expert System and Artificial Intelligence.  For 
example, the FinCen in America built the FAIS . . . .”).   
 158. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 130, at 7. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 5 (“There is a parallel for thinking 
about counterintelligence as a strategic mission.  Just as [U.S.] intelligence is 
mapping the essential features and activities of terrorist groups, so 
[counterintelligence] analysts could determine how foreign intelligence services 
are built and operate—call it [counterintelligence] order-of-battle preparation.”). 
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A. Require Financial Institutions to File Suspicious Activity 
Reports for Suspected Foreign Intelligence Financial 
Transactions 
The recommended workflow for the proposed 
counterintelligence program follows the practices and 
procedures already implemented in the current U.S. AML 
regime.  Financial institutions would be required to make 
changes to their AML detection programs so that they could 
identify suspicious transactions that suggest possible foreign 
intelligence activity.  Part III.C of this Article discusses 
recommendations for identifying these transactions.  Upon 
discovering such a transaction, the financial institution would 
be required to retain documentation of the transaction and 
conduct an investigation into the transaction and the related 
clients, if possible.  Following this investigation, the financial 
institution would be required to file a SAR with FinCEN 
noting its findings.  The SAR form currently in use would 
remain substantially the same, with one modification: an 
additional checkbox labeled “Foreign Intelligence” would be 
added.  The financial institution would check this box, and 
describe why it believes the transaction suggests foreign 
intelligence activity within the free response box in Part V of 
the SAR form. 
Given the unwieldy volume of SARs already submitted to 
FinCEN and its inadequate resources to review all such 
reports,161 review authority should fall to agencies already 
tasked with counterintelligence responsibilities.  Foreign 
intelligence SARs filed with FinCEN would be forwarded to a 
new counterintelligence SAR review team.162  Representatives 
from counterintelligence agencies responsible for domestic 
operations, such as the FBI, CIA and DIA, would comprise 
the team.  However, the FBI should be responsible for leading 
the review team in light of its dominant role in domestic 
counterintelligence activity.163 
 
 161. See FATF, supra note 18, at 3. 
 162. This approach would mimic the SAR review teams recommended in the 
U.S. Department of Treasury’s National Money Laundering Strategy, and the 
review teams currently implemented by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.  See 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-813, COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING: 
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE THE NATIONAL STRATEGY 26 (2003), 
available at http://www.gao.gov /new.items/d03813.pdf. 
 163. Furthermore, the FBI is responsible for the investigation of money 
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Further investigation would be at the discretion of the 
review team in light of the surrounding circumstances.  For 
example, the review team may decide to forward the case to 
the FBI for investigation and possible prosecution.  Or, the 
review team may decide that it would be more appropriate to 
engage in offensive counterintelligence measures through 
another agency, such as turning the identified individual into 
a double agent or providing the individual with 
misinformation intended to deceive the foreign intelligence 
service.164  FinCEN already provides direct access to its SAR 
databases to law enforcement agencies,165 meaning the review 
team could easily access the data.  If a counterintelligence 
checkbox is added to the SAR form, this discrete piece of data 
could be used to distinguish those SARs in the FinCEN 
database.  Furthermore, FinCEN could even limit the review 
team’s access to those SARs related to counterintelligence, if 
that is preferred. 
B. Promoting Compliance by the Financial Institutions 
Disincentives exist for financial institutions to comply 
with these new requirements.  Under the AML regime, 
financial institutions are responsible for financing the 
preventive measures such as the one proposed in this 
Article.166  To pay for these programs, financial institutions 
usually must increase fees charged to clients, reduce overall 
profits, or do both.167  However, compliance can be achieved 
by emphasizing those benefits that the financial institutions 
will derive through cooperation, as well as through designing 
the program to include additional economic incentives for 
those institutions that properly report counterintelligence 
 
laundering related to crimes over which it has jurisdiction.  FATF, supra note 
18, at 4. 
 164. See, e.g., Walter Pincus, New Unit of DIA Will Take the Offensive on 
Counterintelligence, WASH. POST, Aug. 18 2008, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/08/17/AR2008081702244.
html (“The purpose of an offensive counterintelligence operation is not criminal 
prosecution . . . .  In strategic offensive counterintelligence operations, a foreign 
intelligence officer is the target, and the main goals most often are ‘to gather 
information, to make something happen. . . to thwart what the opposition is 
trying to do to us and to learn more about what they’re trying to get from us.’ ”  
(quoting Toby Sullivan, Director of Counterintelligence)). 
 165. FATF, supra note 18, at 3. 
 166. Gordon, supra note 21, at 727. 
 167. Id. 
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SARs. 
The first argument for cooperation by financial 
institutions is that it will assist the bank in providing 
prudential security.  Prudential rules “are designed primarily 
to protect the safety and soundness of individual financial 
institutions and the financial system as a whole.”168  
Financial institutions implement these rules to prevent the 
consequences stemming from risk related to significant loan 
defaults, or “putting all investment (typically lending) eggs in 
one financial basket.”169  Those foreign intelligence operations 
that are uncovered often lead to asset confiscation by the 
government.170  Because illegals are increasingly using 
businesses in the United States under nonofficial cover, a 
financial institution that fails to comply with this new 
counterintelligence reporting regime may suffer financial 
setbacks if a discovered foreign intelligence cover business 
represents a significant portion of the institution’s customer 
base.171 
Financial institutions may ask: if the assets seized are to 
be confiscated, why would the institution have an incentive to 
turn in one of its clients?  Under this new counterintelligence 
program, disincentives could be overcome by offering the 
financial institution a portion of the confiscated assets.  More 
specifically, where banks submit a SAR detailing the 
possibility of foreign intelligence activity, the government 
could compensate banks with these assets.  Where a foreign 
intelligence operation is discovered by law enforcement, 
however, and the financial institution failed to file a SAR 
when there was activity that should have raised suspicion or 
the institution failed to implement an adequate foreign 
intelligence detection system, the government would not 
 
 168. Id. at 706. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Ten Russian Agents Plead Guilty and are to be Removed from the United States 
(Jul. 8, 2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-
releases/2010/nyfo070810a.htm (“[T]he defendants were required to disclose 
their true identities in court today and to forfeit certain assets attributable to 
the criminal offenses.”). 
 171. This is known as concentration risk.  See DIANE REYNOLDS, ANALYZING 
CONCENTRATION RISK (2009), available at http://www.algorithmics.com/ 
EN/media/pdfs/Algo-WP0109AnalyzingConRisk.pdf for a detailed explanation of 
calculating concentration and credit risk. 
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compensate the institution from the seized assets.  Thus, the 
financial institution will have economic incentives to 
implement this proposal effectively within their AML 
program; if they do not, they will lose out on this 
compensation. 
To sweeten the pot, the FBI could offer a cash reward to 
any financial institution that discovers a foreign intelligence 
operation and files a SAR accordingly.  The FBI currently 
offers rewards to anyone who provides information leading to 
the arrest and conviction of a spy.172  Indeed, the FBI will pay 
up to $500,000 for this information.173  This sizeable reward 
may provide an additional incentive for financial institutions 
to comply with the new requirements. 
Without doubt, there will be some financial institutions 
that will find these incentives insufficient to justify the costs 
of implementing the new counterintelligence detection and 
reporting requirements.  All financial institutions would be 
required to follow the new requirements, but there is no 
guarantee that any one particular financial institution will 
find a spy among its clients.  Thus, regulatory risk must also 
be imposed.  The current AML regime already imposes stiff 
regulatory burdens on those financial institutions that fail to 
comply with AML requirements.174  A bank that fails to 
comply would risk severe monetary penalties and the 
possibility of seeing its bank charter revoked.175  
Furthermore, those bank employees involved in the violation 
risk being removed from the financial institution and barred 
from banking.176  Similar penalties could be imposed upon 
banks and other financial institutions that fail to comply with 
the newly imposed counterintelligence program 
requirements.  Compliance testing can be conducted in 
conjunction with general AML examination testing 
 
 172. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Counterintelligence, http://www.fbi.gov/ 
about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/counterintelligence (last visited Jan. 
16, 2013) (“Report Espionage!  You can pocket up to $500,000 for information 
that leads to the arrest and conviction of a spy or to the prevention of espionage.  
To report suspicious activities, contact your local field office or submit an 
anonymous tip.”). 
 173. Id. 
 174. See FFIEC, supra note 82, at 14 (explaining the criminal and civil 
penalties for financial institutions that fail to comply with AML requirements). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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procedures already conducted by the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council.177 
C. Financial Transaction Typologies That May Suggest 
Foreign Intelligence Activity 
Of course, requiring financial institutions to report this 
information would be useless unless these institutions were 
provided foreign intelligence typologies.  Providing financial 
institutions with the knowledge of what a foreign intelligence 
transaction would look like would be the key to the success of 
this counterintelligence program.  Illustrating this point, 
many commentators have noted that one of the major 
weaknesses of the current counterterrorism finance regime is 
that financial institutions are not offered adequate 
information on the typologies that suggest terrorism 
finance.178  Furthermore, feedback regarding the helpfulness 
of the information is rarely provided to financial institutions 
that file SARs.179 
Thus, the agencies responsible for the counterintelligence 
program using the AML regime as a tool for uncovering 
foreign intelligence threats must provide financial 
institutions with possible typologies.  FinCEN could fund an 
analytic review of all SARs filed for all illegals and American 
spies caught since FinCEN’s inception.  If typologies do 
emerge, they could provide this information to financial 
institutions and tailor the requirements to account for any 
compliance burden that may arise.  In addition, interested 
counterintelligence units from organizations such as FBI, 
CIA, DIA, and NCIX, among others, could collaborate to 
propose some suggested typologies based upon their collective 
experience of uncovering spies. 
While developing a comprehensive list of typologies for 
detecting foreign intelligence activities within the United 
States would be outside the scope of this Article, this section 
 
 177. See id. for a detailed description of current AML examination 
techniques. 
 178. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 130, at 27 (“In this 
report, we recommended that FinCEN further develop and document its 
strategy to fully incorporate best practices to help enhance and sustain 
collaboration among federal agencies in the form change process and distribute 
that documentation to all stakeholders.”); Gordon, supra note 21, at 727. 
 179. Id. 
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will discuss those client or transaction characteristics that 
could most readily be included in such a list. 
1. Client is Employed in an Industry Frequently 
Targeted by Foreign Intelligence Agencies 
The primary indicator that a transaction is related to 
foreign intelligence activity would be a suspicious transaction 
conducted by an individual employed by the federal 
government or in an industry frequently targeted by foreign 
intelligence agencies.  In a study conducted by the Defense 
Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC), the 
Center found money to be the dominant factor that led 
Americans to spy on their own country.180  While nearly half 
of those Americans engaged in espionage were never paid, 
this is primarily because counterintelligence officers caught 
most perpetrators before they could transmit information.181 
Aldrich Ames, one of the most famous American spies 
who passed information to the Soviets over the course of a 
decade, reportedly received nearly three million dollars.182  
During this time, Ames purchased an expensive home and 
automobile in cash.183  It is unlikely that he could have 
afforded this behavior on the meager CIA salary he was 
receiving at the time.184  While Ames’s conspicuous antics 
would probably alert counterintelligence security personnel 
regardless of any AML monitoring component, AML efforts 
would be able to detect similar but less extreme cases of 
espionage in the future.  Suspicious transactions made by 
employees frequently targeted by foreign intelligence services 
could prompt the financial institution to check the Foreign 
Intelligence box on the SAR form. 
To aid in this effort, these employees should receive 
heightened scrutiny under the AML due diligence 
requirements.  Such efforts could mimic the heightened due 
diligence requirements already imposed on PEPs, where 
 
 180. HERBIG & WISKOFF, supra note 33, at xii.  PERSEREC maintains a 
database of information on those individuals known to have engaged in 
espionage against the United States, and provides analytic reports 
summarizing the data and suggesting common characteristics that have 
motivated spies in the past.  Id. at v. 
 181. Id. at xi. 
 182. TURNER, supra note 24, at 134. 
 183. Id. at 136. 
 184. Id. 
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financial institutions give greater review to those customers 
who are considered to be more risky.  When ascertaining the 
identity and occupation of the client, the bank could make an 
effort to identify the client’s employer.  Those clients working 
for the government, within the defense industry, and in 
industries involved in sensitive technologies would receive 
greater AML scrutiny.  Similar measures should also be 
taken for those clients working for a government contractor or 
companies similarly associated with U.S. policymakers.  
Indeed, one-fourth of civilian American spies worked for 
contractors at the time they engaged in acts of espionage.185 
Because financial institutions will absorb the majority of 
these heightened monitoring costs, the counterintelligence 
community should take on the responsibility of identifying 
the industries and corporations that are most at-risk and 
therefore deserve increased attention.  It would be the 
counterintelligence community that has the most readily 
available information on employers that are at-risk of foreign 
intelligence penetration.  Outside of the defense and weapons 
industries, the technologies most heavily targeted by foreign 
intelligence collectors include “aeronautics, information 
systems, lasers and optics, sensors, and marine systems.”186  
Counterintelligence officials could compile lists of companies 
within these industries, as well as those government agencies 
and contractors that warrant increased scrutiny.  Such a 
process would need to be continuous, as government 
organization and economic situations change over time. 
2. Client Has Poor Credit 
Credit ratings could also be used by financial institutions 
to identify espionage.  Of those Americans who committed 
espionage on behalf of other countries for money, only about 
twenty percent committed espionage for purposes of greed.187  
In contrast, half of these Americans engaged in espionage 
 
 185. HERBIG & WISKOFF, supra note 33, at xi. 
 186. ONCIX, supra note 8, at iii. 
 187. HERBIG & WISKOFF, supra note 33, at 41.  “Some people spied for money 
because they needed it to pay off debts or to get themselves out of some other 
fix, while others did so from greed.  We coded ‘need or greed’ variables and the 
type of financial pressures or luxury purchases reported for our cases where 
these details were available.”  Id. at 40. 
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because they were in financial trouble.188  This can include 
financial insolvency, bankruptcy, or late payments on various 
forms of debt.189  For example, Russian KGB operatives 
recruited Richard Miller, an FBI counterintelligence officer 
struggling to make his mortgage payments.190  He traded 
classified material for $50,000 in gold, several cash payments 
of unknown amounts, and sexual favors from a female KGB 
officer.191  Similarly, Bruce Ott of the U.S. Air Force 
attempted to pass classified material to the KGB in 1986 to 
alleviate his debt problems.192  Ott’s peer described him as “ ‘a 
spendthrift who bounced checks, overused his credit cards, 
had his car repossessed, and was in such financial trouble on 
his honeymoon that his wife footed the entire bill.’ ” 193  While 
this Article has already proposed imposing heightened due 
diligence on all employees within the government and 
sensitive technology industries, poor credit ratings of those 
employees could warrant the highest form of scrutiny. 
In the alternative, credit ratings could be used as a 
means of limiting the number of employees subject to 
heightened scrutiny.  For example, if financial institutions 
argue that it would be economically unfeasible to impose 
increased due diligence standards on all employees within the 
government and sensitive technology industries, credit 
ratings could be used to narrow the scope of the scrutiny to 
those employees most at-risk of espionage recruitment. 
3. The Transaction Involves a Possible Foreign 
Intelligence Front Organization 
Foreign intelligence services engage extensively in covert 
intelligence operations within the United States using “front 
organizations.”194  The goals of these organizations are to 
conduct business that advances the intelligence service’s 
interests without maintaining any apparent links to a foreign 
government, or provide nonofficial cover for intelligence 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. at 40–41. 
 192. Id. at 41.  
 193. Id. (quoting G. Kell, Alleged Spy “Glad It Was Over,” SACRAMENTO BEE, 
July 31, 1986). 
 194. Kevin A. O’Brien, Covert Action: The “Quiet Option” in International 
Statecraft, in 3 STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE 23, 40 (Loch K. Johnson ed., 2007). 
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operatives.195  Identification of money laundering activities 
conducted by these front organizations could prompt a 
financial institution to file a foreign intelligence SAR. 
This Article recognizes three instances where financial 
institutions should file a foreign intelligence SAR when an 
organization or company within the United States engages in 
suspicious financial activity.  First, some front organizations 
do indeed have overt ties to a foreign nation’s government.196  
For example, communist and socialist parties have engaged 
in political advocacy in the past through the use of front 
organizations.197  Other organizations are owned and 
controlled directly by another nation’s government and there 
are some intelligence services that take advantage of this 
control.198  For example, during the Cold War, the KGB would 
often act as a filter for any Soviet organization operating in a 
foreign country.199  Any suspicious transactions carried out by 
such organizations should be reported through a foreign 
intelligence SAR. 
Second, an organization or company that attempts to 
hide the nature of its control may justify the filing of a foreign 
intelligence SAR.  A shell company is an entity such as a 
corporation, limited liability company, or trust that has no 
physical presence except a mailing address and generates 
little, if any, economic value.200  Shell companies use “bearer 
shares, nominee shareholders, and nominee directors . . . to 
mask ownership in [the] corporate entity.”201  The AML 
community has already identified the use of shell companies 
in transactions as a potential indicator of general money 
laundering activity.202  While shell companies are often used 
 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See U.S. MONEY LAUNDERING THREAT ASSESSMENT WORKING GRP., U.S. 
MONEY LAUNDERING THREAT ASSESSMENT 47 (2005), available at http://
www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/new_6_2006/FinCEN%20Feb%2006
%20ML.pdf. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (FINCEN), FIN-2006-G014, 
POTENTIAL MONEY LAUNDERING RISKS RELATED TO SHELL COMPANIES (2006), 
passim, available at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/Advisory 
OnShells_FINAL.pdf (“Shell companies have become common tools for money 
laundering and other financial crimes, primarily because they are easy and 
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for legitimate purposes, they can be used in illicit 
transactions to hide the true identities of the company 
owners.203 
Some front organizations begin as a legitimate enterprise 
but their control is later assumed by foreign intelligence 
services.204  If a company doing business in the United States 
were to engage in transactions with a shell company, the 
financial institution may investigate the nature of the 
transaction.  If it becomes apparent that the shell company is 
being used to hide the origin of control, and if that control is 
connected to a foreign nation, this type of transaction may 
suggest foreign intelligence operations and may warrant a 
filing. 
Third, regardless of their ownership or origin, 
organizations and companies doing business in the sensitive 
technology industries should also be subject to a level of 
heightened scrutiny, similar to the previously suggested 
scrutiny imposed upon individuals employed within that 
industry.  Foreign intelligence SAR filings would be 
appropriate for any suspicious transaction conducted by a 
company in one of these industries. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States currently has an intricate system in 
place to monitor financial transactions for irregular activity 
that may suggest criminal behavior.  At the present time, the 
system is designed to defeat money laundering and terrorism 
finance efforts.  With several small changes, however, the 
system could be used as a powerful tool in the detection of 
foreign intelligence activity.  A counterintelligence program 
that uses the current AML regime would not be foolproof; 
many spies have motivations beyond monetary gain.205  But 
the transactions of those individuals and organizations that 
are increasingly targeted by foreign intelligence services 
would be under much greater scrutiny and could provide 
 
inexpensive to form and operate.”). 
 203. U.S. MONEY LAUNDERING THREAT ASSESSMENT WORKING GRP., supra 
note 200, at 47–48 (“The use of these legal structures for money laundering is 
well established.”); see FINCEN, supra note 202, at 4.   
 204. See U.S. MONEY LAUNDERING THREAT ASSESSMENT WORKING GRP., 
supra note 200, at 47. 
 205. See HERBIG & WISKOFF, supra note 33, at 40. 
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counterintelligence officials a wealth of information about 
potential threats. 
The advantages of implementing such a system are 
apparent.  First, many SARs filed by financial institutions are 
not sufficiently scrutinized for counterintelligence-related 
activity by FinCEN because of the agency’s decision to 
prioritize terrorism finance-related transactions.  The 
proposed program would use counterintelligence resources to 
analyze many of the unviewed SARs, which could improve 
counterintelligence operations.  Second, the program would 
improve detection of suspicious transactions related to foreign 
intelligence by prompting a concerted effort by 
counterintelligence officials to suggest and provide financial 
institutions with concrete typologies of such transactions.  
And third, it would make those employees and organizations 
in a position to be targeted by foreign intelligence services 
under heightened scrutiny in the current AML regime. 
Ultimately, it is important to remember that AML efforts 
are not unique to the United States.206  Nothing prevents 
foreign nations from conducting similar counterintelligence 
operations using their own AML programs.  One thing is 
certain: lessons that may be learned from the implementation 
of this program would provide our own U.S. intelligence 
officers working overseas the know-how and capabilities of 
concealing their transactions and avoiding detection by 
foreign counterintelligence units.  Should the United States 
fall behind in the cat-and-mouse world of intelligence?  Or 
should it remain one step ahead of its adversaries, pioneering 
a new form of proactive counterintelligence? 
 
 206. Most AML laws implemented by the United States are in accordance 
with international standards set forth by FATF.  SCHOTT, supra note 22, at III-
7–III-8. 
